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DIY SOLUTIONS TO THE
HOBBY LOBBY PROBLEM
Kristin Haule∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 is one of the most
controversial Supreme Court decisions in recent times, yet the
practical problems it creates are also some of the easiest to fix. The
decision has been criticized for bolstering the rights of corporations
at the expense of actual people—notably women. But there are many
public misconceptions about the actual implications of this case.
Fortunately, the perceived injustices are actually much smaller and
more easily fixable than is generally understood.
In Section II, this Note discusses the historical backdrop leading
up to the Hobby Lobby decision. It explains how the law evolved to
raise the issue presented in Hobby Lobby. It also illustrates where the
Hobby Lobby decision fits within the back-and-forth dialogue
between the Supreme Court and Congress regarding free exercise
rights.
Section III of this Note focuses on the current law, explaining
the HHS contraceptive mandate portion of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Hobby Lobby decision’s impact
on that mandate.
In Section IV, this Note critiques the existing law, pointing out
popular criticisms and potential ramifications of the Hobby Lobby
decision.
Section V outlines three potential solutions to the problems
created by the Hobby Lobby decision, and Section VI elaborates
upon which of these three solutions is the best.
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, May 2016. Tremendous thanks to Professor
Justin Levitt for his expert guidance and valuable feedback in writing this Note. Many thanks also
to the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their careful and diligent efforts in
bringing this Note through the publication process.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Understanding the evolution of free exercise rights in the United
States is critical to fully understanding the Hobby Lobby decision, its
context, and its implications. Free exercise rights have not been static
throughout history. Rather, the current state of the law is the result of
a back-and-forth dialogue between the Supreme Court, limiting the
scope of free exercise rights, and Congress, expanding it. In many
ways, the Hobby Lobby decision is the next statement within that
back-and-forth dialogue.
A. Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith
In 1987, the Oregon legislature passed a law prohibiting the
possession of controlled substances not prescribed by a medical
practitioner.2 It included the hallucinogenic drug peyote within the
definition of “controlled substance.”3 While several other states
exempted sacramental peyote use from their respective drug laws,4
Oregon did not.5
Following this law’s passage, a private drug rehabilitation
organization in Oregon fired two of its employees, Alfred Smith and
Galen Black, for ingesting peyote at a Native American Church
ceremony.6 Both employees were members of the Native American
Church, a widespread religion among Native Americans.7 The State
of Oregon subsequently denied the employees’ unemployment
compensation applications because they had been discharged for
“work-related misconduct.”8 The employees brought suit,
challenging the constitutionality of the Oregon statute under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.9
Existing case law at the time seemed to support Smith and
Black.10 Both legal scholars and the general public assumed that the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Smith’s

Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 872–74.
Janet V. Rugg & Andria A. Simone, The Free Exercise Clause: Employment Division v.
Inexplicable Departure from the Strict Scrutiny Standard, 6 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL

2016]

THE HOBBY LOBBY PROBLEM

193

government must justify burdening this kind of religious practice by
demonstrating a compelling governmental interest, especially in
employment benefit cases such as this.11 Plus, popular opinion
supported Smith and Black.12
Nonetheless, in April of 1990, the Supreme Court departed from
this precedent13 and held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not prevent a state from creating a drug law that
prohibits even sacramental peyote use.14 The Court reasoned that to
rule otherwise would essentially eviscerate our legal system.15 It
declined to apply strict scrutiny to such generally applicable laws
which inadvertently burden religious practice, explaining that to do
so would “creat[e] a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws.”16 It further explained that the political process could
adequately protect these religious rights if that is what society
wants.17 A rehearing was denied on June 4, 1990.18
B. RFRA & AIRFA Amendments 1994
The Smith decision was wildly unpopular, among both regular
citizens and legislatures.19 Congress reacted quickly to the Smith
decision, taking particular note that “the free exercise of religion may
be protected through the political process.”20 The very next month,
on July 26, 1990, lawmakers introduced the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) into the House.21 RFRA states that the
government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general

COMMENT. 117, 126 n.40 (1990) (describing the two-part strict scrutiny test adopted in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and followed by several cases thereafter).
11. Id. at 126–28.
12. Id. at 119.
13. Id. at 127.
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
15. Id. at 885 (explaining that “[t]o make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest
is ‘compelling,’ permit[s] him, ‘to become a law unto himself’”).
16. Id. at 886.
17. Id. at 890 (“Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.”).
18. Id. at 872.
19. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE
END OF SECULAR POLITICS 37 (2007).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 4 (1993).
21. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990).
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applicability, unless the law passes strict scrutiny.22 This originally
applied to both federal and state laws.23 Congress cited the
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment as its
constitutional authority for passing RFRA.24 In 1993, RFRA became
law.25
The following year, Congress relied on its power to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes to pass the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994.26 Included among the
amendments was a law protecting traditional Indian religious use of
peyote.27 The law itself included a statement that lawmakers passed
these amendments in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith.28
C. City of Boerne v. Flores
City of Boerne v. Flores29 then challenged RFRA’s
constitutionality. The City of Boerne, Texas, enacted Ordinance
91-05 to protect historic landmarks.30 The Saint Peter Catholic
Church in Boerne sought a building permit to enlarge the church
building to accommodate its growing parish, but the permit was
denied under the Ordinance.31 The Archbishop of the church, P.F.
Flores, brought suit, challenging the ordinance as invalid under
RFRA.32 The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the city and
invalidated RFRA as applicable to the States.33 It explained, “RFRA
is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior” under the Fourteenth Amendment.34
The Flores Court echoed and elaborated upon many of the
concerns brought up in Smith. It explained that RFRA substantially
22. Id.
23. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 5 (1993).
24. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 13–14 (1993).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1994).
26. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344,
1325 (1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
28. § 1996a(a)(4)–(5).
29. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
30. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (1996).
31. Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 532.
34. Id.
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curtails the States’ traditional general regulatory power.35 RFRA’s
scope far exceeds the purported goal of preventing and remedying
constitutional violations for two reasons.36 First, RFRA was not
limited to laws that have been motivated by religious bigotry.37
Second, numerous state laws substantially burden individuals.38
Furthermore, RFRA’s stated goal was to essentially overrule the
Smith decision by adopting the strict scrutiny standard for laws of
general applicability that incidentally burden religious practice.39
Therefore, RFRA, as applied to the States, ventures impermissibly
into the judicial branch of government.40
But Congress does not need to rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to carve out a religious practices exemption for
federal laws.41 This is presumably proper under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, as necessary and proper to carrying out the
implementation of each of the existing laws to which Congress
wishes to carve out an exception.42 Furthermore, the Flores concerns
about violating the separation of powers arose in the context of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clause powers.43
Therefore, the separation of powers concerns do not apply to
Congress’s power to apply RFRA to the federal government.44
Consequently, while Flores invalidated RFRA as applied to state
laws, RFRA remains in effect as applied to federal laws, at least to

35. Id. at 534.
36. Id. at 535.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 536 (“RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one
before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional
authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”).
40. Id.
41. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause Congress’ ability
to make laws applicable to the federal government in no way depends on its enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Flores decision does not determine the
constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government.”).
42. Id. at 959 (“[F]inally, the Committee believes that Congress has the constitutional
authority to enact [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislative
branch has been given the authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional
value . . . .”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 17 (1993)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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the extent that Congress does not create future laws which modify or
repeal it.45
D. RLUIPA
In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which amended RFRA by
expanding the term “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”46 RLUIPA clarified the intended sweeping breadth
of RFRA: “the exercise of religion ‘shall be construed in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.’”47
In 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretation that RFRA is still valid law as applied to the federal
government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal.48 In that case, a religious group brought suit, challenging the
federal Controlled Substances Act’s proscription of the group’s use
of hoasca—a Schedule I hallucinogenic tea used as part of the
group’s religious services.49 The Court determined that under RFRA,
the federal government must still justify enforcement of its laws that
burden religious institutions by demonstrating a compelling
interest.50
In support of its decision requiring strict scrutiny, the Court first
pointed out that the president and Congress have already exempted
Native American religious use of peyote, another Schedule I
substance, from the Controlled Substances Act.51 It rejected the
government’s argument that, notwithstanding RFRA’s longstanding
protection of sacramental peyote use, the Court should nonetheless

45. Id.
46. Enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000), incorporated to apply to all of RFRA under 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-2.
47. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-3(g)).
48. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
49. Id. at 423–24.
50. Id. at 430–31 (“RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”).
51. Id. at 421.
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carve out an exception to RFRA to ban even religious use of
hoasca.52 The Court explained:
While there may be instances where a need for uniformity
precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally
applicable laws under RFRA, it would be surprising to find
that this was such a case, given the longstanding peyote
exemption and the fact that the very reason Congress
enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a
claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled substance.53
The Court also pointed out that RFRA itself already “plainly
contemplates” a mechanism for determining exceptions to RFRA.54
In response to the government’s slippery-slope concerns, the Court
explained, “RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the
compelling interest test, of exceptions to ‘rule[s] of general
applicability.’”55
Finally, the Court countered the government’s concerns about
eviscerating Congress’s purposes for passing the Controlled
Substances Act by outlining Congress’s reasons for enacting
RFRA.56 It elaborated, “Congress recognized that ‘laws “neutral”
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise,’ and legislated ‘the
compelling interest test’ as the means for the courts to ‘strik[e]
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.’”57
III. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
The historical context of free exercise rights is only part of the
story. It is also important to see where Hobby Lobby fits within the
context of recent healthcare law changes.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 439.
Id.
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A. ACA
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA).58 The ACA is a very expansive law, and it changed
a great many aspects of the healthcare system.59 Among the many
changes effected by the ACA is the following preventative services
provision:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering
group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a
minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any
cost sharing requirements for . . . (4) with respect to
women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . .
as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by
the Health Resources and Services Administration for
purposes of this paragraph.60
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) is
an agency subset of the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).61 The HRSA sought the Institute of
Medicine’s (IOM) recommendations for its guidelines.62 The IOM’s
report recommended that insurance plans cover “[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with
reproductive capacity.”63 The FDA-approved contraceptive methods
include diaphragms, oral contraceptive pills, intrauterine devices, and
emergency contraceptives such as Plan B and ulipristal, commonly
known as the morning-after pill and the week-after pill,
respectively.64
On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted IOM’s recommendations.65
On February 15, 2012, HHS published its rules finalizing the HRSA

58. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
The law was amended a week later. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
59. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
60. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2010).
61. Id. at 1283, n.1.
62. Id. at 1283.
63. Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2016)).
64. Id. at 1284 (citing another source).
65. Id. (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 46621; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130).
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guidelines.66 The guidelines stated that “[u]nless grandfathered or
otherwise exempt, employers’ group health plans must provide
coverage conforming with the guidelines for plan years beginning on
or after August 1, 2012.”67 Some “religious employers” are exempt,
as are employers with fewer than fifty employees.68 Any non-exempt
employer that fails to comply with the mandate must pay a fine of
$100 per day per affected individual.69 The fine for failing to provide
health insurance altogether is $2,000 per year per full-time
employee.70
B. Hobby Lobby
The Greens own the Hobby Lobby craft store franchise, as well
as the Mardel Christian bookstore franchise.71 The Hahns own
Conestoga Wood Specialties, a closely-held for-profit corporation.72
The Greens and Hahns brought suit against Kathleen Sebelius,
Secretary of the HHS, challenging the validity of the HHS
contraceptive mandate under RFRA and the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause.73 Specifically, the Greens contended that while their
religious beliefs obligate them to provide health insurance to their
employees, these beliefs prohibit them from providing abortioncausing drugs and devices.74 In fact, Hobby Lobby’s insurance plans
have long explicitly excluded “contraceptive devices that might
cause abortions and pregnancy-termination drugs like RU-486.”75
Hobby Lobby argued that it was faced with “an unconscionable
choice: either violate the law, or violate their faith.”76 Both families
specifically object to four methods of contraception that operate after

66. Id.
67. Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 41726, 41729).
68. Id. To qualify as a “religious employer,” the main purpose of the organization must be to
teach religious values, the organization must primarily employ persons who share the
organization’s religious tenets, the organization must primarily serve persons who share the
organization’s religious tenets, and the organization must be a nonprofit organization under
§§ 6033(a)(1), 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), or 6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. Id.
69. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2765.
72. Id. at 2764.
73. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
74. Id. at 1285.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 133).
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the fertilization of an egg.77 They believe these four methods are
abortifacients, and to offer these methods as part of their health
insurance plan would be tantamount to facilitating abortions, to
which the families object on religious grounds.78
The Supreme Court sided with the petitioners, holding that:
(1) closely-held for-profit corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, fall
within the scope of “persons” to whom RFRA applies, and (2) the
HHS contraceptive mandate, as applied to Hobby Lobby and others
similarly situated, fails the strict scrutiny that RFRA requires.79
C. Corporations Are People
In reaching its determination that corporations qualify as
“people” within the meaning of RFRA, the Court first evaluated the
text of the law itself. Because RFRA does not define the term
“person,” the Court consulted the Dictionary Act.80 Pursuant to the
Dictionary Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.”81 There is nothing in RFRA
that signals Congressional intent to deviate from the Dictionary Act’s
definition of “person” to exclude corporations such as Hobby
Lobby.82
Next, the Supreme Court noted that it has previously entertained
both RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit
corporations.83 Plus, HHS conceded that a nonprofit corporation can
be a “person” under RFRA.84 Because there is no authority for
interpreting the term “person” to include some, but not all
corporations, within the context of a single statute, and because
nonprofit corporations appear to qualify as people under RFRA,
closely-held for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby must also
qualify.85 The decision does not, however, impact publicly traded
companies with a large number of unrelated shareholders, because it

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762–63.
Id. at 2759.
Id. at 2755.
Id. at 2768.
Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
Id.
Id. at 2768–69.
Id. at 2769.
Id.
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is difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain the sincere religious beliefs
of such corporations.86 But because no such company brought a
RFRA claim in this case, the Court did not decide whether RFRA
applies to such publicly-traded companies.87
The Court also noted the sweeping breadth of RFRA itself as
evidence that Congress did not intend to exclude corporations.88 It
stressed this point by emphasizing that Congress went “far beyond”
what is constitutionally required.89 Congress, the Court explained,
designed RFRA to provide “very broad protection for religious
liberty.”90 But according to Justice Ginsburg, “RFRA’s purpose was
‘only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith,’ not to
‘unsettle other areas of the law.’”91
However, in context, it is clear that Congress’s concern about
“unsettl[ing] other areas of law” primarily involved inadvertently
burdening religious organizations in other ways.92 It was not, as
Ginsburg contends, an attempt to proactively limit the scope of
RFRA to avoid unsettling other areas of law in general.93
Specifically, Congress mentioned that rights granted to religious
organizations under the Establishment Clause shall remain in effect,
that religious accommodations under Title VII shall be unchanged,
and that “granting” rights should not be construed as “denying”
rights.94 Although it also specified that religious organizations
distributing literature are still subject to generally applicable time,
place, and manner restrictions to their free speech, the bulk of
Congress’s focus seemed to involve not incidentally burdening a
religious organization’s other established rights.95
From a policy perspective, the Supreme Court has, in recent
years, also shown its concern for protecting entities and corporations
by expanding constitutionally-protected individual rights to cover
them. In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,96
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 2774.
Id.
Id. at 2767–68.
Id. at 2767.
Id.
Id. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993)).
S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12–13 (1993).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
S. REP. NO. 103-111 at 13–15 (1993).
Id. at 13.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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the Court held that “the Government may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity” and that
restricting corporate expenditures for electioneering communications
violated those First Amendment free speech rights.97 Then, in 2012,
the Court reinforced these protections by holding that a Montana
statute banning corporate expenditures, which support or oppose a
candidate or political party, violated the corporation’s free speech
rights.98 Though this idea is still a point of contention for many,99 it
is consistent with recent precedent. Therefore, it is unsurprising that
the Court held in this case that privately-held corporations are
“people” for the purposes of RFRA’s protections.
True to form, the Supreme Court also expressed concern about
disincentivizing businesses from incorporating in the Hobby Lobby
opinion. It explained, “we reject HHS’s argument that the owners of
the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to
organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole
proprietorships or general partnerships.”100 Supporting its conclusion
that corporations qualify as “people” within the meaning of the
statute, the Court explained, “A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”101 The
Court elaborated that extending constitutional or statutory rights to
corporations effectively protects the rights of the people involved
with the corporation, including shareholders, officers, and
employees.102 While HHS and the dissent argued that RFRA should
not apply to corporations because corporations cannot exercise
religion, the Court explained that, “allowing Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious
liberty of the Greens and the Hahns.”103
Justice Ginsburg pointed out, however, that a person doing
business as a sole proprietorship, for example, is incentivized to
incorporate to separate him- or herself from the entity in order to
97. Id. at 365 (explaining that “[s]ection 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures are therefore invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary”).
98. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
99. See Adam Winkler, Corporations Are People, and They Have More Rights Than You,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler
/corporations-are-people-a_b_5543833.html.
100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
101. Id. at 2768.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2769.
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escape personal liability for the entity’s obligations.104 It seems
unfair, she explained, for this person to effectively be a corporation
when it is convenient to escape liability, but then to also be a person
when that is convenient to help the company dodge federal
regulatory legislation.105 However, this apparent injustice was
statutorily created, and could therefore be statutorily remedied.
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s problem isn’t with the Court’s
interpretation of RFRA, but rather with RFRA itself.
D. Strict Scrutiny
RFRA essentially imposes a form of strict scrutiny on federal
laws and regulations which substantially burden the exercise of
religion, requiring that the government establish that its law: “(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”106
E. Substantial Burden
HHS argued the contraceptive mandate does not impose
a substantial burden because the connection between providing
health-insurance coverage and destruction of an embryo is too
attenuated.107 As HHS explained, an embryo would only be
destroyed if an employee chose to use one of the four contraception
methods at issue.108 The Court rejected this argument on two
grounds: (1) this argument does not address the issue of whether the
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the objecting parties’
ability to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs;
and (2) this argument really addresses whether the religious belief
asserted is reasonable, a question the federal courts “have no
business addressing.”109 It continued, “[I]t is not for us to say that
their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our
‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line
drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”110 The Greens and Hahns
104. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2779 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)).
107. Id. at 2777.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2778.
110. Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716 (1981)).
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believe that the four contested contraception methods are tantamount
to abortion; the parties do not dispute that this represents an honest
conviction.111
This argument is tautological, though. Finding an honest
conviction only establishes that the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious
practice is burdened.112 The Court does not seem to acknowledge a
mechanism by which it can determine whether that burden is
substantial.113 If petitioners have honest beliefs, the law is
necessarily a substantial burden; if the government tries to establish
that the burden is insubstantial, it necessarily engages in a forbidden
analysis of the religion’s merits. This essentially elevates every
incidental burden on an honestly-held religious conviction to the
level of “substantial burden,” and forbids any discussion to the
contrary.
To further justify its holding that the mandate imposes a
substantial burden, the Court characterized the fine for failure to
comply with the HHS contraceptive mandate as economically
“severe.”114 Aggregating the total cost of the fines over the course of
a year, the Court found that continuing to offer group health plans
that exclude the contraceptives at issue would result in fines of $457
million for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15
million for Mardel.115 Dropping health insurance coverage altogether
would result in fines of $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million
for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.116
It is unclear from the opinion what these companies earn in
profit each year, or what percentage of the businesses these sums
represent. According to Forbes, Hobby Lobby earned roughly $3.3
billion in revenue from January through October 2014.117 Assuming
Hobby Lobby didn’t earn another dollar in 2014, this would still
make the $26 million fine for dropping employee coverage less than
0.79% of Hobby Lobby’s annual revenue.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2775.
115. Id. at 2775–76.
116. Id. at 2776.
117. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014).
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An amicus brief in support of HHS further argued that the
$2,000 per employee penalty for failing to provide health insurance
was actually less than the cost of providing insurance, and therefore
eliminated any substantial burden.118 But the Court rejected this
argument as well.119 First, the Court noted that this argument was not
raised below and was not raised by any party.120 Next, the Court
pointed out that this argument ignores the fact that the Greens’ and
Hahns’ religious beliefs require them to provide health insurance for
their employees.121 Because their beliefs require both that they
provide health insurance for their employees and that they not
facilitate post-fertilization contraception methods, the substantial
burden could not be mitigated.122
Finally, the Court explained that simply comparing the raw cost
of the $2,000 penalty for dropping coverage altogether with the raw
cost of providing health insurance coverage omits other costs.123
Namely, it ignores the cost to the company of becoming a less
competitive employer for failing to offer health insurance.124
Furthermore, the Court doubted that either the Congress that enacted
RFRA or the Congress that enacted the ACA would have found it
reasonable to force a business to decide between violating its
sincerely held religious beliefs and making all of its employees lose
their healthcare plans.125
Presumably, though, the Congress that enacted the ACA
anticipated that many employers would have to choose between
providing plans that comply with the new standards and dropping
coverage altogether, since that is what the law mandates.126 And
though the Congress that passed RFRA intended the scope to be
sweeping,127 it is unclear whether it intended to make all incidental
burdens
on
honestly-held
religious
beliefs
necessarily
128
“substantial.”
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2777.
Id. at 2776–77.
Id.
Id. at 2777.
Id. at 2762.
Id. at 2767.
See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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F. Compelling Governmental Interest
RFRA requires the government to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in applying the challenged law specifically “to
the person.”129 The Court rejected most of HHS’s purported
compelling governmental interests, such as “promoting public
health” and “gender equality” as being too broadly-framed to qualify
under RFRA.130 However, HHS also asserted that it has a compelling
interest in ensuring all women have access to contraception without
cost sharing.131 The Court assumed arguendo that this was
sufficiently compelling, notwithstanding the numerous exceptions to
the mandate (including the grandfathered plans exception).132
G. Least Restrictive Means
Once the government establishes a compelling interest, it must
also establish that the law, as applied to the people claiming a
substantial burden, is the least restrictive means for furthering that
interest.133 Here, the Court explains that the government did not
demonstrate that it lacks other, less restrictive means of achieving its
asserted goal of providing all women access to contraception without
cost sharing.134 One such alternative, it opines, would be for the
government to pay for the four contraceptives at issue to any woman
unable to obtain it due to her employers’ religious objections.135
HHS has not demonstrated that this alternative is unviable.136 The
Court explained further that the cost of providing the four
contraceptives at issue would likely be minor in light of the overall
cost of the ACA.137 Finally, RLUIPA requires the government to
sometimes incur expenses “to avoid imposing a substantial burden
on religious exercise.”138

129. Id. at 2779 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2014)).
130. Id. (quoting Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 46, 49).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2780.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2781.
138. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2014)).
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In fact, there is already a system in place for the government to
cover the cost of religious exemptions such as these.139 When a
nonprofit organization with a religious objection self-certifies that it
opposes providing coverage for contraceptive services, the insurance
issuer or third-party administrator must exclude such coverage from
the group health plan and pay separately to cover the services.140 The
insurance issuer or third-party administrator may not pass these costs
down to the organization, the group health plan, or the patients.141
The Court suggested that the government could presumably just
extend this mechanism to also accommodate closely-held for-profit
companies with religious objections, such as Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood Specialties.142 It noted this is actually a more
effective means of accomplishing its stated goal than if these
organizations dropped insurance coverage altogether and forced their
employees to pay for individual plans in order to receive these free
services.143
However, it is entirely possible this alternative is untenable in
practice. Hobby Lobby alone employs 23,000 people.144 Obviously
not every Hobby Lobby employee is female, but female dependents
of male (and female) workers are also affected.145 And of course, the
decision is not limited to the petitioners in this suit. According to a
2000 study, 52% of Americans work for a “closely-held”
corporation.146
And it is possible, if not likely, that at least some of these other
closely-held corporations may object on religious grounds to aspects
other than the four contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby. These
closely-held corporations could, in theory, object on religious
139. Id. at 2782.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2783.
144. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014).
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
146. Aaron Blake, A Lot of People Could Be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth Control
Decision—Theoretically, WASH. POST: THE FIX (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-courts-birth
-control-decision/; see also Schulyer Velasco, Hobby Lobby Decision: Eight Important Numbers
to Know, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014
/0701/Hobby-Lobby-decision-Eight-important-numbers-to-know/90-percent.
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grounds to any number of provisions in any number of laws.
Requiring the government to assume the cost of every mandate every
closely-held corporation objects to quickly snowballs past the point
of economic feasibility.
The Court then distinguished the contraceptive mandate from
services like immunizations by explaining that the government’s
interest in preventing the spread of communicable diseases is
fundamentally different from its interest in ensuring all women have
access to contraception without cost sharing.147 It noted in particular
that the “least restrictive means” of providing the respective services
would be different.148 But the HHS listed “promoting public health”
among its compelling interests for issuing the contraceptive
mandate.149 This is presumably the same interest furthered by
immunization services.
It is also unclear how requiring the government to absorb the
cost of providing contraception services is fundamentally different
from requiring the government to absorb the cost of providing
immunizations. Though the spread of communicable diseases might
seem to be a more compelling interest, which affects more people
more severely, the least restrictive means of accomplishing both
goals appears to be the same. Furthermore, there is no precedent to
support the idea that the more compelling a government interest, the
more it can restrict RFRA rights even when less restrictive
alternatives are available.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION
The very same concerns expressed in Smith and Flores are also
implicated in the Hobby Lobby decision. Namely, RFRA carves out
an exception from every federal law for contentious religious
objectors.150 As discussed above in Section III(b)(ii)(1), the Court
does not address the question of whether the burden on a person’s
religious beliefs is substantial. Instead, it asks only whether the belief
is sincerely held.151 Because it is difficult to disprove a person’s

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
Id.
Id. at 2779 (quoting Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 46, 49) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2779.
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subjective belief, and even the smallest potential burdens on religious
exercise qualify, the potential for abuse is worrisome.
Hobby Lobby alone employs 23,000 people.152 This decision
will impact every female employee, as well as every female
dependent covered under the plans.153 But of course Hobby Lobby,
Mardel Christian, and Conestoga Wood Specialties aren’t the only
closely-held corporations affected by this decision. Allowing every
closely-held corporation to object to federal laws it deems
inconvenient on the basis of religious objection has the potential to
cause “havoc.”154
The Court had other concerns, though. It insisted that allowing
the government to require all employers to provide coverage for all
legal medical procedures under RFRA would pave the way for
mandatory third-trimester abortions and assisted suicide.155 This
result, it explains, would exclude conscientious religious objectors
from participating in this nation’s “economic life.”156
While these extreme hypotheticals certainly reveal the Court’s
deepest concerns and fears, they do not compellingly justify its
decision. First, there is a big difference between requiring an
unwilling patient to undergo an unwanted mandatory third-trimester
abortion or assisted suicide and requiring an unwilling employer to
offer a group health insurance plan which covers such procedures in
jurisdictions where they are already legal. One forcibly violates a
citizen’s bodily integrity while the other amounts to a tax or fine.
Secondly, the notion that enforcing such a mandate would cause
these religious objectors to give up their businesses and opt out of
American “economic life” is unsupportable. There are doubtlessly
many state laws of general applicability, which incidentally burden
religious exercise. Since state laws are not covered under RFRA,157
and these burdens generally fall short of Free Exercise Clause
protection,158 corporations are still subject to these burdens.

152. Americas Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014).
153. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2783.
156. Id.
157. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
158. Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
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On the other hand, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent,
“[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives.”159 The Court does not adequately explain
why its unsupported fear that corporations will withdraw from
American economic life trumps the long-established reality that
women unable to control their reproductive lives are unable to
participate equally in economic and social life.
Perhaps the answer lies in considering the Hobby Lobby
decision’s place in the broader conversation between Congress and
the Supreme Court on the appropriate level of protection for free
exercise rights. Since the Smith decision, there has been a virtual
ping-pong match wherein the Supreme Court issues a decision,
warning about the dangers inherent in protecting free exercise rights
too vigorously, followed by a congressional statute, lamenting the
Supreme Court’s failure to adequately protect these important rights,
and so forth.
A notable difference distinguishing Hobby Lobby from Smith
and Flores is that in Smith and Flores, the Supreme Court cautioned
against the dangers inherent in providing such broad free exercise
protections in order to strike down the requested religious
exemptions. By contrast, the Supreme Court seemingly ignores its
reasoning in Smith and Flores in order to uphold the religious
exemption at issue in Hobby Lobby. So far Congress has not heeded
the Supreme Court’s warnings about the dangers of carving out
religious exceptions from every general applicable law. It first passed
RFRA, then bolstered it by passing RLUIPA and the AIRFA
Amendments.
If popular opinion originally motivated Congress to bolster
religious protections, perhaps popular opinion can similarly motivate
it to change course now. Furthermore, by effectively invalidating one
of Congress’s own laws (the contraceptive mandate portion of the
ACA), the Hobby Lobby decision may make the Supreme Court’s
point finally resonate with Congress in a way that the Supreme
Court’s previous warnings seemingly haven’t.

159. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Hobby Lobby decision has been widely criticized by the
public.160 However, much of the popular backlash against the Hobby
Lobby decision misses the mark. Many people conflate the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause protections with those protections
granted by RFRA.161 They therefore overestimate both the scope of
the Hobby Lobby decision and the obstacles standing in the way of a
solution.162 The result has been a lot of misdirected rage aimed at the
Supreme Court.163
But it is important not to lose sight of the issue, especially
because the solution is very attainable. Hobby Lobby is not actually a
constitutional decision. It does not dictate that the First Amendment
permits corporations to ignore the contraceptive mandate portion of
the ACA. Rather, it instructs that this right is granted by RFRA, a
Congress-enacted piece of legislation.164 Because Congress enacted
both the ACA and RFRA, the law can be changed by popular
opinion. The American public can use its voting power to either put
pressure on the existing members of Congress, or to change the
makeup of Congress in order to change the law. It is therefore
important to redirect public opinion away from the Supreme Court
and toward Congress to implement change.
There are three main ways Congress could change the law:
(1) amend the ACA, such that the provision does not run afoul of
RFRA; (2) amend RFRA, limiting its scope such that the ACA, and
future laws like it, are not affected; or (3) repeal RFRA entirely.
The first option—amending the ACA—would probably be the
most difficult of the three potential solutions. While it is theoretically
possible for Congress to amend the ACA in a way that develops a
scheme to make all health plans cover all recommended forms of

160. See Staci Zaretsky, Angry Mob Takes to Twitter to Scream at SCOTUSBlog for Hobby
Lobby Decision, ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://abovethelaw.com
/2014/07/angry-mob-takes-to-twitter-to-scream-at-scotusblog-for-hobby-lobby-decision/.
161. Id.; see also Jamie Fuller, How the Internet Blamed the Wrong Twitter Handle for
Today’s Hobby Lobby Ruling, WASH. POST: THE FIX (June 30, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/how-the-internet-blamed-the-wrong-twitter-handle-for
-todays-hobby-lobby-ruling/.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
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contraception without running afoul of RFRA, the difficulties in
doing this in practice quickly become apparent.
First, it assumes that this is even possible in practice. It is likely
that closely-held corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, will feel that
any employee receiving such a benefit as a result of her employment
with or connection to Hobby Lobby is tantamount to facilitating
abortions, even if the government, for example, paid the portion of
plan premiums that covered these services and required the insurance
company to keep the money in two separate funds.165 Presumably at
some point, the corporation’s claims might become too attenuated to
establish a “substantial burden,” but it is extremely unclear from the
decision when, if ever, that occurs.
Nonetheless, supposing arguendo that it were possible either to
get Hobby Lobby to agree to a scheme, or for the burden imposed by
such a scheme to dip below the critical “substantial” threshold line,
that has resolved the issue for only one corporation. Other
corporations may view the scheme as substantially burdening their
free exercise of religion in other ways or for other reasons. And
because the standard is what the corporation subjectively believes, in
theory, two members of the same religion—perhaps even the same
church—could potentially view different aspects of the law as
unduly burdensome.
To avoid this, Congress could completely overhaul the ACA to
cut out the corporate middleman and simply have the government
provide or subsidize group health insurance for employees of all
religious organizations and closely-held corporations. This, however,
would require a major overhaul of the law as well as the mechanisms
currently in place to provide these employees with health insurance.
Flooding the medical exchanges with all these extra employees, for
example, could very easily cause problems for the whole system, if
not carefully planned for and managed. Indeed, there appears to be a
more elegant solution.

165. This was the rationale behind several employers’ objections to filling out a form
informing the government that they objected on religious grounds to the contraceptive mandate.
See Reply Brief of Appellants at 5, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134
S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13-1540), 2014 WL 1653856, at *11. Docket available at http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13a691.htm. Lower court’s decision available
at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014.12.27-Order-denying-PI.pdf.
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Alternatively, instead of attempting to craft an ACA amendment
that complies with RFRA, Congress could amend the ACA to apply,
notwithstanding RFRA, effectively carving out an exemption from
RFRA for the ACA. Ultimately, however, simply amending the ACA
doesn’t really fix the bigger problem. While it would effectively
overturn the Hobby Lobby decision as it applies to the contraceptive
mandate, it is not the best solution for fundamentally fixing the
potential problems RFRA can cause. Such a scheme would require
Congress to manually fix every law it fears RFRA will undermine.
But RFRA threatens to undermine essentially every federal law. A
piecemeal approach of effectively carving out an exception to an
exception in order to make every federal law whole again is therefore
not the best way to fix all of RFRA’s potential pitfalls.
The second two options—either amending or repealing RFRA—
seem fraught with far fewer problems and do not require radically
changing the current state of religious accommodation.
First, Congress could amend RFRA. Just as easily as it expanded
the scope of RFRA’s protections by passing RLUIPA, it can pass
another law limiting the scope back down. The biggest challenge
here would probably be getting Congress to agree where to draw the
line. If the constitutional protections, which leave in place laws of
general applicability which incidentally burden religious exercise,
are insufficient, what is sufficient, and why? How does Congress
adequately balance the rights of people (and closely-held
corporations) to freely exercise their chosen religion with the need
for the nation’s federal laws to have teeth? It is a difficult question
for a single person to answer, much less a majority of the two houses
of Congress.
Perhaps, then, a more elegant solution would be for Congress to
repeal RFRA altogether. After all, this was done with respect to state
laws in Flores, and business does not appear to have come to a
screeching halt as a result. While this appears at first glance to
provide less protection for religious liberties, any unjust result can be
mitigated. Just as several states (including, eventually, Oregon)
exempted sacramental peyote use from its drug laws, so too could
Congress amend its own laws to mitigate any unjust result.
Although it is, in general, not always easy to get Congress to
agree to pass a law, presumably if the burden is significantly unjust,
Congress can band together, as it did when originally passing RFRA
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and RLUIPA, to create specific exceptions to specific laws. This is
preferable to a blanket exception to all federal laws. Under RFRA, in
its current state, when Congress finally does come together to pass
sweeping legislation like the ACA, the law is poked so full of
exemption holes that its full force and effect crumble. This is
precisely the danger the Supreme Court warned of in the Smith
decision.
Of course no solution is perfect. The primary concern with
leaving the decision to the legislative process about which religious
liberties should be proactively protected is that minority religions
may not get the same protections as more popular religions. This
concern is definitely valid—whenever protections are essentially left
to the majority to enforce, minorities are often unprotected.
However, safeguards already exist within the existing
constitutional framework to protect minority religions. Because these
must be laws of general applicability, the majority is still unable to
specifically target an unpopular religion with a burdensome law.
Furthermore, the passage of RFRA following the Smith case
shows that the majority can and does stand up to correct unjust
results when a new law of general applicability burdens longestablished religious practice. Of course the system may not be
perfect, and religions that are more stigmatized may not get the same
benefit of legislative protection that a more popularly-supported
religion gets. But under the current system, a person can simply
create a new religion to avoid complying with any federal laws they
don’t like. No system is perfect, and falling back on the
constitutional protections, while relying on Congress to mitigate
unjust results, is preferable to the alternatives.
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSAL
Congress changing the law eloquently solves the two main
problems. In the smaller sense, the concern that corporations get to
trounce all over their female employees’ (and dependents’)
reproductive rights will be resolved. Closely-held corporations will
be required to comply with all generally-applicable federal laws that
incidentally burden their religious practice just as they are already
required to comply with all such state laws. No longer will the
women covered under these companies’ plans or the federal
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government have to worry about coming up with alternative options
for meeting the individuals’ healthcare needs.
In the broader sense, Congress no longer has to worry about
essentially undermining every federal law it passes. Laws that
Congress deemed important enough to pass in the first place will
regain their “teeth,” and the policies underlying these laws will again
thrive without being potentially undermined by a critical mass of
exemptions.
Furthermore, urging Congress to fix the injustices created by its
law is the most productive use of public outrage. It is,
quintessentially, why the public has the right to vote and change the
makeup of Congress. And because the Hobby Lobby decision deals
only with the protections afforded under RFRA, as opposed to the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, there are no
constitutional implications.
Amending the law also assuages the Supreme Court’s
ever-present concerns about overstepping its boundaries on issues
that can be adequately resolved through the popular vote and
political process. But Congress’s utilization of the political process to
implement RFRA in direct response to an unjust result for the
employees in Smith was overkill. Simply put, as explained in Smith,
these rights can be adequately protected by the political process, and
do not require blanket protection at the expense of all generallyapplicable laws.166
VII. CONCLUSION
Since 1990 when the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Smith, Congress and the Supreme Court have engaged in a lengthy
back-and-forth political struggle over the appropriate level of First
Amendment free exercise protection. In Smith, the Court saw past the
unfortunate consequences that would inevitably befall the
sympathetic defendants in front of it to establish the general principle
that keeping laws of general applicability in full force and effect is
more important than protecting the rights of the people to exercise
their chosen religion freely and without burden. Outraged by the
unjust result that befell these particular defendants, Congress acted
swiftly to reverse the Supreme Court’s ruling to the full extent
166. Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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possible. But perhaps it acted too quickly, and without its eye on the
bigger picture.
The Supreme Court, outraged itself that Congress would attempt
to overturn one of the Court’s rulings so quickly and so substantially,
reemphasized the drastic and sweeping impacts a law like RFRA
would have, and invalidated RFRA as applied to the states for being
too out of proportion to any perceived remedial objective.
And back and forth it went over the years until Hobby Lobby,
where the Supreme Court appeared to reverse course, finally
upholding an asserted religious exemption under RFRA. Although
the Court expressed that its reasons for doing so were a concern for
protecting the rights of people who incorporate, it is probably no
coincidence that it chose to uphold the exemption when applied to a
law Congress itself had passed.
Although this battle might have been about the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause when it began, by the time it has
reached Hobby Lobby, the Constitution is no longer part of the
dialogue. RFRA is responsible for this result. And because the
problem is statutory, as opposed to constitutional, it is much easier to
fix. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby is all
about the proper way to interpret RFRA (as opposed to the
Constitution), changing (or ideally, repealing) RFRA eliminates the
need for this interpretation, and as a result, the problems that arise
from it.

